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A U T H O R
I
Andrew Crown-Weber
Autopoiesis: 
Self-Creation in 
Nietzsche
am	 a	 Senior	 English	 and	 Linguistics	 major.	 I	
participated	 in	 the	 Gaines	 Fellowship	 and	 the	
Honors	 Program.	 I	 received	 the	 John	 Spalding	
Gatton	 Provost’s	 Scholarship	 in	 the	 Arts	 and	 Sci-
ences	 and	 was	 inducted	 into	 Phi	 Beta	 Kappa.	 Next	
year	 I	 will	 teach	 English	 as	 a	 Second	 Language	 in	
a	 small	 town	 in	 Austria	 via	 the	 Fulbright	 Program.
Abstract 
A	recurrent	theme	in	the	philosophy	of	Friedrich	
Nietzsche	 is	 his	 imperative	 that	we	must	 create	
ourselves.	Though	this	theme	of	self-creation	runs	
throughout	 	 the	entirety	of	his	published	works,	
Nietzsche	 neither	 fully	 articulates	 in	 one	 place	
the	processes	and	guidelines	by	which	such	self-
creation	could	occur,	nor	does	he	fully	resolve	the	
paradoxes	 inherent	 in	 this	 concept.	 This	 paper	
attempts	to	distill	from	these	fragments	a	coherent	
interpretation	of	 both	how	we	 can	 and	why	we	
should,	despite	(or,	paradoxically,	because	of)	our	
many	 external	 and	 internal	 constraints,	 fashion	
ourselves	the	way	an	artist	shapes	a	work	of	art.
Introduction
Throughout	his	works,	one	of	Friedrich	Nietzsche’s	
most	common	and	consistent	calls	was	for	his	read-
ers	to	create	themselves	—	at	least	those	capable	of	
creating	themselves.	We	hear	the	first	notes	of	this	
call	sounded	in	Nietzsche’s	first	published	work,	
The Birth of Tragedy,	when	Nietzsche	talks	of	our	
“status	as	art	works”	and	how	the	“genius	in	the	
act	of	creation”	becomes	“at	once	subject,	object,	
poet,	actor	and	audience.”	This	idea	of	shaping	one-
self	as	an	“aesthetic	phenomena”	(BT,	5)	is	finally	
announced	explicitly	by	the	middle	period	when	
Nietzsche	asserts:	“We,	however,	want to become 
those we are	—	human	beings	who	are	new,	unique,	
incomparable,	who	give	themselves	laws,	who	cre-
ate	themselves”	(GS,	335).	Here	we	see	Nietzsche	
adding	nuances	to	this	idea,	knotting	together	his	
maxim	“become	who	you	are”	with	the	project	of	
self-creation.	As	we	shall	see,	self-creation	is	the	
means	by	which	one	becomes	what	one	is.	Even	
in	Nietzsche’s	last	productive	year	we	find	him	giv-
ing	Goethe	the	highest	praise	when	he	announces	
that	Goethe	“disciplined	himself	to	wholeness,	he	
created	himself”	(TI,	IX,	49).	This	essay	will	first	
examine	Nietzsche’s	conception	of	the	self	and	then	
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Mr.	 Andrew	 Crown-Weber’s	 essay,	 “Autopoesis:	 Self-Creation	 in	
Nietzsche,”	 was	 easily	 the	 best	 and	 most	 original	 essay	 I	 have	 re-
ceived	 from	 any	 of	 my	 undergraduate	 students	 in	 several	 years.	
He	 wrote	 the	 essay	 as	 a	 term	 paper	 for	 my	 class	 on	 “Nietzsche:	
First	to	Last,”	and	the	paper	reveals	a	sophisticated	and	broad	grasp	not	
just	of	Nietzsche’s	 entire	 corpus	 (an	 impressive	enough	 feat	 in	 its	own	
right),	 but	 also	 of	 the	 difficult	 issues	 and	 problems	 that	 surround	 the	
favorite	Nietzschean	 injunction	 to	“become	who	you	are.”	 	Mr.	Crown-
Weber	does	a	fine	 job	of	 sorting	out	 and	criticizing	 the	 implications	of	
both	 the	 “essentialist”	 and	 “existentialist”	 theories	of	 self-hood,	 and	he	
demonstrates	 convincingly	 that	Nietzsche	actually	adheres	most	 closely	
to	 the	 latter,	while	 still	 employing	 some	of	 the	 language	of	 the	 former.	
Mr.	Crown-Weber	also	has	the	courage	to	take	on	one	of	the	leading	
lights	among	contemporary	Nietzsche	scholars	(Brian	Leiter),	and,	in	my	
view,	he	successfully	demolishes	Leiter’s	influential	“fatalistic”	and	“natu-
ralistic”	account	of	Nietzsche’s	view	of	the	self.		Mr.	Crown-Weber’s	inter-
pretation	of	Nietzsche’s	denial	of	free	will	as	a	part	of	his	campaign	against	
Christianity	is	interesting	and	provocative,	and	his	novel	interpretation	of	
the	“automatic”	and	“aesthetic”	dimensions	of	Nietzschean	self-creation	
is	very	promising	and	original.		Equally	impressive	is	his	suggestion	that	
the	value	of	an	“egoistic”	act	depends	on	the	value	of	the	person	who	per-
forms	it.		Surely	this	goes	to	the	heart	of	Nietzsche’s	philosophy,	and	Mr.	
Crown-Weber	offers	a	sympathetic	and	insightful	discussion	of	this	point	
with	 a	nuanced	 response	 to	 several	 anticipated	objections	 to	 the	 same.	
Finally,	this	essay	is	a	pleasure	to	read.		It	is	artfully	composed	and	
beautifully	written.		
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turn	to	how	Nietzsche	believes	we	can	create	ourselves	
and	why	he	believes	we	should.	In	order	to	understand	
what	Nietzsche	means	by	‘self-creation’	we	will	need	
to	 examine	 that	 self’s	 interaction	 with	 the	 external	
world	and	grapple	with	many	seeming	contradictions	
in	Nietzsche’s	philosophy	that	threaten	to	muddle	this	
encomium	into	meaninglessness.
 
The Self
We	 face	 our	 first	 contradiction	 when	 looking	 at	
Nietzsche’s	view	of	the	self.	At	first	blush	he	seems	
to	give	both	an	 ‘essentialist’	and	an	 ‘existentialist’	
account	of	 the	 self.	An	essentialist	 account	 is	 one	
in	which	each	person	has	an	essential	core,	a	True	
Self,	which	lies	at	‘the	base’	of	the	personality	and	
character,	analogous	to	the	Christian	concept	of	‘the	
soul.’	This	essential	core,	because	it	is	an	extremely	
specific	entity,	is	static,	unchanging,	and	therefore	it	
is	often	associated	with	the	concept	of	‘Being,’	that	
is,	 something	 eternal	 and	otherworldly,	 the	 prime	
example	of	Being	being	God.	The	existentialist	ac-
count	of	the	self	is	contained	in	the	phrase	‘existence	
precedes	essence.’	Existentialists	deny	the	existence	
of	any	essential	self,	typically	because	they	deny	the	
existence	of	any	essential	Being	in	the	world,	which	
is	typically	the	source	of	the	essential	self.	Without	
the	boundaries	of	essence,	the	self	dynamically	changes	
over	time.
Nietzsche	seems	to	use	the	language	of	essential-
ism	when	he	says	that	each	person	has	“a	productive	
uniqueness	within	him	at	the	core	of	his	being”	(UM,	
143)	or	urges	people	to	“Be	yourself!	All	that	you	are	now	
doing,	thinking,	and	desiring	is	not	really	yourself”	(UM,	
127).	These	both	imply	a	‘true’	self	outside	of	current	
appearances.	However,	when	we	examine	Nietzsche’s	
philosophy	as	a	whole,	we	find	that	Nietzsche’s	account	
of	the	self	leans	toward	the	existentialist	conception	and	
favors	the	dynamic	model.
Thus,	we	see	Nietzsche	asserting	that	“the	unalter-
able	character,”	a	hallmark	of	the	static	conception	of	
self,	“is	not	in	the	strict	sense	true”	(HH,	41).	He	believes	
it	is	only	laziness	and	the	shortness	of	life	that	lead	us	
to	delude	ourselves	into	thinking	of	our	character	and	
ourselves	as	given,	monolithic	facts.	As	he	says:	“Man	
becomes	that	which	he	wills	to	become,	his	willing	pre-
cedes	his	existence”	(HH,	35).	This	statement	not	only	
shows	the	malleability	of	the	self	but	allows	that	our	will	
has	a	shaping	power	to	direct	our	becoming.	It	is	within	
this	framework	that	Nietzsche	can	metaphorically	cast	
us	as	both	creators	and	created	works	of	art	—	though,	
as	we	shall	see,	the	actual	agency	and	autonomy	of	this	
‘creative	will’	will	come	into	question.
Nietzsche’s	uses	of	essentialist	tropes	are	the	excep-
tions	that	prove	the	rule	of	his	dynamic	conception	of	
self.	He	uses	essentialist	rhetoric	as	a	skillful	means	of	
encouraging	us,	because	it	is	reassuring	to	believe	the	
fiction	of	having	a	‘true’	self	one	only	needs	to	find	—	for	
this	frees	us	of	the	responsibility	of	creation	by	saying	
we	need	only	uncover	this	self.	However,	at	bottom,	Ni-
etzsche	concurs	with	Zarathustra	when	he	says:	“Some	
souls	one	will	never	discover,	unless	one	invents	them	
first”	(Z,	154).	Thus	the	‘to	be’	in	the	mixed	message	
maxim	“become	who	you	are,”	can	be	understood	as	an	
ideal,	unattainable	shaping	of	our	becoming	in	such	a	
way	that	one	“create[s]	and	carr[ies]	together	into	One	
what	is	fragment	and	riddle	and	dreadful	accident”	(Z,	
252)	in	order	to	approximate	the	perfection	associated	
with	the	idea	of	‘soul’	or	‘true	self’.
Nietzsche’s	 view	 differs	 from	 the	 prototypical	
existentialist	account	of	the	self,	embodied	in	Sartre’s	
philosophy.	 For	 Sartre,	we	 choose	what	we	 become	
and	are	 therefore	 responsible	 for	 every	aspect	of	our	
becoming,	of	our	self.	 	Nietzsche	does	not	 take	such	
a	 radical	 stand.	Although	 I	will	 argue	 that	Nietzsche	
does	believe	we	can	choose	aspects	of	what	we	become,	
there	are	undeniable	determinants	of	our	behavior	that	
limit	our	ability	to	choose.	These	determinants	include	
the	totality	of	external	events	outside	of	our	control,	or	
‘fate,’	or	unchosen	but	fundamental	internal	aspects	of	
ourselves,	such	as	our	genetics	and	drives.	For	Nietzsche,	
the	autonomy	necessary	for	self-creation	will	have	to	
occur	within	the	constraints	of	unchosen	external	and	
internal	factors.
It	is	precisely	regarding	the	issue	of	our	autonomy	
that	Brian	Leiter	 raises	 a	 paradox	 that	 questions	 the	
possibility	 of	 self-creation.	Nietzsche’s	 troubling	 and	
unclear	position	toward	determinism	and	fatalism	ques-
tions	the	autonomy	considered	necessary	for	a	person	to	
create	him	or	herself.	To	use	Leiter’s	example:	If	I	were	
brainwashed	into	becoming	a	criminal,	though	I	would	
be	 causally	 responsible	 for	 the	 criminal	 activity,	we	
would	not	intuitively	say	that	I	had	‘created’	myself	as	a	
criminal.	Leiter	claims	that:	“Nietzsche	the	fatalist	views	
a	person	like	a	plant:	just	as…	the	essential	natural	facts	
about	a	tomato	plant	determine	its	development…	so	
too	the	essential	natural	facts	about	a	person	determine	
its	development”	(Leiter,	223).	These	natural	facts	are	
‘causally	primary,’	that	is:	“they	are	necessary	for	[an]	
effect…	though	they	may	not	be	sufficient	for	it”	(Leiter,	
224).	Thus	one	must	necessarily	have	the	natural	fact	of	
tallness	to	become	an	NBA	center,	although	this	is	alone	
is	not	sufficient	for	becoming	one.	This	brings	us	to	the	
paradox:	“If	a	person’s	life	trajectories	are	determined	
in	advance	by	the	natural	facts	about	himself,	then	how	
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son,	a	plurality	with	one	sense”	while	our	reason	and	
consciousness	is	a	subservient	“little	reason”	which	is	
a	“toy	of	[our]	great	reason”	(Z,	147).	But	though	“our	
organism	is	an	oligarchy”	(GM,	II,	1)	with	‘mind’	sub-
servient	to	‘body,’	the	fatedness	of	our	big	reason	and	
by	extension	the	fate	of	the	universe,	the	little	reason	
still	has	a	limited	freedom	of	will.	Metaphorically	it	has	
the	power	to	nudge	in	one	direction,	but	not	the	ability	
to	shove	and	certainly	not	the	absolute	power	to	steer.	
To	use	a	nautical	metaphor,	the	idea	of	absolute	freewill	
is	 the	 illusory	 idea	 that	we	are	 like	 the	captains	of	a	
nuclear-powered	ship	able	to	go	at	full	impulse	in	any	
direction	we	like.	Nietzsche’s	view	is	that	we	are	rather	
like	captains	of	a	sailboat,	who	cannot	sail	against	the	
wind	of	fate	but	still	have	the	responsibility	of	tacking	
a	course	within	those	winds.
As	ever,	the	important	consideration	for	Nietzsche	is	
your	response	to	‘the	way	the	universe	is,’	whether	you	
affirm	the	necessitude	of	the	existent	or	gnash	your	teeth	
at	it.	In	what	I	consider	Nietzsche’s	definitive	take	on	
the	paradox	of	free	will	and	fate,	he	discusses	‘Moham-
medan	fatalism,’	which	“embodies	the	fundamental	error	
of	setting	man	and	fate	over	against	one	another	as	two	
separate	things.”	Against	this	error,	Nietzsche	proposes	
that	man	and	his	‘free	will’	are	a	part	of	fate	itself	and	
thus	the	seeming	“struggle”	and	paradox	of	‘free	will’	
versus	‘fate’	“is	imaginary”	(WS,	61).	Both	“free	will”	
and	the	“unfree	will”	(BGE,	I,	21)	are,	as	we	will	briefly	
touch	on	later,	simplifications	and	falsifications	of	the	
world,	owing	to	the	limited	perspective	from	which	we	
can	experience,	and	therefore	come	to	know	something	
about,	the	universe.	Consider	the	following:
You	have	 to	believe	 in	 fate…	what	 then	
grows	out	of	this	belief	in	your	case	—	coward-
ice,	resignation	or	frankness	and	magnanimity	
—	bears	witness	 to	 the	soil	upon	which	 the	
seedcorn	has	been	scattered	but	not,	however,	
to	the	seedcorn	itself	—	for	out	of	this	anything	
and	everything	can	grow	(HH,	332).
This	 quote	 suggests	 that	 the	 important	 question	
is	 not	 whether	 or	 not	 we	 have	 autonomy,	 but	 how	
we	psychologically	 respond	 to	 a	world	 in	which	our	
answers	to	this	dilemma	are	uncertain.		The	weak	and	
slavish	response	is	one	of	resignation	while	the	strong	
and	masterful	response	is	one	of	boldness	and	a	faith	
that	we	are	ones	who	can	become	who	we	are,	who	are	
‘turning	out	well,’	for	“it	is	only	a	matter	of	strong	and	
weak wills”	(BGE,	I,	21)	and	few	possess	the	necessary	
strength	of	will	 for	 self-creation.	 “Everyone	possesses 
inborn talent,	but	few	possess	the	degree	of	inborn	and	
acquired	toughness,	endurance	and	energy	actually	to	
become	a	talent,	that	is	to	say	to	become	what	he	is:	
which	means	to	discharge	it	in	works	and	actions”	(HH	
I,	263).	Here	we	see	Nietzsche	denying	the	treasured	
can	a	person	really	create	himself,	i.e.,	how	can	he	make	
an	autonomous causal	contribution	to	the	course	of	that	
life?”	(Leiter,	226).	
From	 this	perspective	we	can’t	 really	create	our-
selves,	for	the	requirement	of	‘autonomy’	would	require	
a	causa sui	origin	outside	of	the	chain	of	all	previous	
causes	 and	 effects	 —	 something	 so	 impossible	 that	
Nietzsche	himself	goes	so	far	as	to	call	the	idea	a	“rape	
and	perversion	of	logic”	(BGE,	I,	23).	However	from	this	
perspective	nothing	is	ever	created,	for	even	the	doodling	
of	a	smiley	face	would,	from	this	perspective,	be	said	
to	 be	 a	 non-autonomous	 and	 therefore	 non-creative	
act.	Therefore,	if	Nietzsche	subscribed	to	this	view	and	
yet	still	 speaks	about	creation	at	all,	we	must	accept	
that	autonomy	is	not	essential	to	his	understanding	of	
creation.	This,	I	will	argue,	does	not	scuttle	the	whole	
project	of	self-creation	in	Nietzsche.	This	is	why	I	believe	
‘autopoiesis’	captures	Nietzsche’s	view	of	self-creation	
the	best.	Aside	from	being	in	the	language	of	his	be-
loved	Greeks,	the	‘poiesis’	not	only	denotes	creation	but	
connotes	poetry,	recalling	the	aesthetic	aspect	of	such	
creation.	The	‘auto’	not	only	means	simply	‘self,’	but	also	
connotes	a	certain	‘automatic’	involuntary	aspect	of	this	
self-creation,	again	highlighting	Nietzsche’s	lowlighting	
of	agency	and	emphasis	on	fatedness.
Nietzsche’s	main	impetus	for	problematizing	free	
will	comes	not	from	his	‘naturalism’	(a	role	in	which	
Leiter	the	naturalist	is	eager	to	cast	him)	but	from	its	
association	with	Christianity,	and	therefore	slave	moral-
ity	—	those	eternally	recurrent	bogeymen	in	Nietzsche’s	
writings.	The	idea	of	the	absolute	freedom	of	the	indi-
vidual	to	choose	is	derived	from	the	Christian	solution	
to	the	‘Problem	of	Evil,’	namely:	If	God	is	both	all-good	
and	all-powerful,	why	does	evil	occur?	If	he	is	all	good	
and	‘wants’	good	for	all,	then	he	must	not	be	powerful	
enough	to	bring	this	about.	If	he	is	all-powerful	and	could 
banish	evil,	then	he	must	choose	not	to	and	is	therefore	
not	all-good.	The	Christian	solution	is	to	say	that	God	is	
both	all-good	and	all-powerful,	but	he	gave	humans	the	
free	will	to	choose	to	obey	his	laws.	Evil	exists	because	
humans	choose	not	to	obey	God.	Nietzsche	of	course	
rejects	this	entire	account.	His	problematizing	of	free	will	
is	an	attempt	to	swing	this	pendulum	of	thought	back	
to	a	Classical	Greek	view	–	the	view	of	fate	we	find	in	
Aeschylus	in	which	the	workings	of	the	world	are	deeply	
mysterious	and	“in	which	Moira	[fate],	as	eternal	justice,	
is	seen	enthroned	above	men	and	gods	alike”	(BT,	9).	
Nietzsche	holds	that	we	currently	overemphasize	agency	
and	do	not	 recognize	 the	 extent	 to	which	unchosen	
events,	both	external	and	internal,	play	a	decisive	role	
in	what	we	do,	and	thus,	who	we	become.
Nietzsche	has	Zarathustra	announce:	“Body	am	I	
entirely,	and	nothing	else;	and	soul	is	only	a	word	for	
something	about	the	body…	The	body	is	a	great	rea-
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ling	what	we	do	in	order	to	“give	style”	to	our	character	
by	“survey[ing]	the	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	[our]	
nature	and	then	fit[ing]	them	into	an	artistic	plan”	and	
according	to	a	“single	taste”	(GS,	290).
One	method	of	achieving	this	is	to	examine	what	
has	guided	our	actions	heretofore,	that	is	to	say,	our	
morality.	The	creators	must	examine	what	“tablets	of	
values”	they	have	lived	by	and,	if	necessary,	destroy	
those	tablets	that	impede	our	self-creation.	The	creators	
will	 then	 posit	 their	 own	 ‘Yes’	 and	 ‘No,’	 their	 own	
‘straight	line’	and	‘goal’	(TI,	I,	44),	that	is	they	will	posit	
an	ideal	conception	of	who	they	want	to	become	and	
create	for	themselves	a	morality	that	will	allow	them	
to	achieve	this	conception.	From	thence	forth,	what	is	
‘good’	will	be	what	moves	them	toward	this	goal,	this	
will	be	their	“own	categorical	imperative”	(A,	11).	At	
first	this	may	sound	extremely	disturbing	from	a	‘moral’	
standpoint,	but	as	we	will	see	later,	this	is	not	nearly	as	
ghoulish	as	it	sounds.	This	is	merely	a	recognition	that	
our	morality	and	our	self	interpenetrate.	Like	Escher’s	
image	of	the	two	hands	drawing	each	other,	we	both	
create	our	values	and	our	values	create	us.	This	is	what	
Zarathustra	means	when	he	says:	“To	value	is	to	create”	
[schätzen	ist	schaffen]	(Z,	177)	and	why	Nietzsche	calls	
self-creators	 those	who	 “give	 themselves	 laws,	who	
create themselves”	(GS,	335).
“Every	morality	is…	a	bit	of	tyranny	against	“na-
ture””	(BGE,	290).	This	tyranny	channels	our	becoming	
toward	our	goal.	Thus	we	should	submit	to	our	self-
posited	moralities	 the	way	a	poet	submits	 to	writing	
a	haiku,	for	it	is	within	the	restrictions	of	17	syllables	
that	innovations	and	beauty	emerge.	Nihilism,	the	utter	
freedom	of	constraints,	would	be	like	free	verse,	which	
Robert	Frost	disdainfully	referred	to	as	“playing	tennis	
without	the	net.”	Though	these	new	values	will	place	
new	restrictions	upon	us,	they	do	not	make	us	less	free	
but	rather	more	free.	This	result	is	because	true	freedom	
for	Nietzsche	 is	 not	 ‘freedom	 from	 restrictions’	 but	
the	‘freedom	to	become	who	we	are’	(Z,	176)	and	this	
freedom	will	grow	as	we	subtract	out	of	our	lives	all	
resistances	and	frictions	hampering	us	from	becoming	
who	we	are.	This	freedom	is	a	“harmony	among	all	of	
a	person’s	preference	schemes.	It	 is	a	state	in	which	
desire	 follows	 thought,	 and	 action	 follows	 desires,	
without	tension	or	struggle,	and	in	which	the	distinction	
between	choice	and	constraint	may	well	be	thought	to	
disappear”	(Nehamas,	187).		
To	attain	 this	 freedom,	we	must	daily	engage	 in	
what	Nietzsche	calls	 ‘self-overcoming.’	Self-overcom-
ing	is	the	process	by	which	we	progress	toward	a	goal	
through	determined	and	persistent	application	of	energy	
and	hard	work.	Say	we	want	 to	become	 ‘brave.’	We	
must	first	determine	what	being	‘brave’	will	mean	for	
us	—	for	“a	virtue	must	be	our own invention”	(A,	11)	
shibboleth	that	“all	men	are	created	equal”	—	it	is	only	
the	“few”	who	possess	the	“inborn”	and	thus	unchosen	
means	of	becoming	who	they	are.	But	how	do	you	know	
if	you	have	this	inborn	talent?	You	find	yourself	in	the	
same	bind	that	Calvinist	believers	in	predestination	find	
themselves:	you	can’t	know	for	certain.	One	has	to	have	
faith	in	being	‘chosen’	and	one	shows	this	faith	by	acting	
like	a	‘chosen’	person	would	act.	In	the	same	way,	a	test	
for	whether	you	have	 this	 inborn	“toughness,	endur-
ance	and	energy”	is	whether,	in	response	to	this	quote,	
you	say	“Yes”	and	go	out	and	manifest	these	qualities	
or	instead	say	“No”	and	do	not	engage	in	the	activities	
of	self-becoming,	demonstrating	a	lack	of	said	inborn	
faculties.	There	are	either	‘strong’	or	‘weak’	responses	to	
the	question	of	inborn	capacity.	“He	has	no	spirit	who	
seeks	spirit”	(HH,	547).	That	is,	if	you	don’t	think	you	
have	that	capacity,	then	you	don’t.
Incidentally,	I	believe	a	great	amount	of	Nietzsche’s	
appeal	to	readers	stems	from	his	conspiratorial	‘us	ver-
sus	them’	style	of	writing,	which	implies,	though	never	
states	explicitly,	that	his	reader	must	be	one	of	the	few	
—	presumably	by	virtue	of	having	the	good	taste	to	read	
Nietzsche!	And	because	you	have	the	good	taste	to	be	
reading	my	words,	we’ll	assume	that	we’re	both	one	of	
the	few	capable	of	creating	ourselves…
How We Can Create Ourselves
To	become	a	self-creator	we	must	first	analyze	the	
material	we	have	to	work	with:	we	do	this	by	ana-
lyzing	ourselves	with	an	intellectual	conscience	to	
find	what	values,	drives,	and	virtues	constitute	us.	
We	have	to	find	what	makes	us	a	“unique	miracle”	
(UM,	127).	First	of	all,	Nietzsche	does	not	believe	this	
kind	of	introspection	can	ever	be	complete,	for	“noth-
ing…	can	be	more	incomplete	than”	a	person’s	“image	
of	the	totality	of	drives	that	constitute	his	being”	(D,	
116).	However	this	is	a	good	thing.	People	who	delude	
themselves	into	believing	they	know	exactly	who	they	
are	 create	 a	 self-fulfilling	 prophecy	 causing	 them	 to	
actually become that.	Because	Nietzsche	believes	that	
life	is	a	process	of	seeking	to	grow,	expand,	and	increase	
one’s	power,	taking	“know	thyself”	to	the	extreme	of	
actually	believing	we	do	know	ourselves	fully	can	freeze	
the	potentiality	of	our	becoming	by	pouring	it	into	one	
static	mold.	Growth	demands	leeway.	As	Zarathustra	
puts	it:	“One	must	still	have	chaos	in	oneself	to	be	able	
to	give	birth	to	a	dancing	star”	(Z,	Pr.,	5).
After	this	introspection,	we	must	move	on	to	do	as	
“[a]ctive,	successful	natures”	do,	who	“act,	not	accord-
ing	to	the	dictum	“know	thyself”	but…	“will	a	self	and	
thou	shalt	become	a	self”	(HH,	II,	366).	Because	we	are	
what	we	do,	or	as	Nehamas	puts	it,	“the	sum	total	of	
qualities	that	can	be	attributed	to	us,”	willing	a	self,	and	
therefore	self-creation,	will	mean	changing	and	control-
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—	and	then	overcome	our	current	‘non-brave’	self	to	
manifest	our	newly	posited,	idiosyncratic	definition	of	
bravery	in	actions.
Through	 the	 process	 of	 self-overcoming	we	will	
become	a	new	self.	However,	this	does	not	mean	that	
our	self-overcoming	has	achieved,	or	even	can	achieve,	
its	 goal,	 for	Nietzsche	 does	 not	 believe	 this	 process	
does	or	should	have	any	ultimate	end	or	goal.	Consider	
Nietzsche’s	parable:	“Not	every	end	is	a	goal.	The	end	of	
a	melody	is	not	its	goal;	but	nonetheless,	if	the	melody	
had	not	reached	its	end	it	would	not	have	reached	its	
goal	either”	(WS,	204).	We	are	like	this	melody	—	keep	
this	in	mind	when	reading	the	quotation	that	ends	this	
essay.	Thus	to	return	to	our	example	of	bravery,	after	we	
have	become	‘brave’	according	to	our	own	definition,	
we	will	not	sit	on	our	laurels	but	instead	posit	a	new,	
even	more	demanding	definition	of	bravery	to	fight	to	
attain.	We	will	be	like	Faust	who	from	desire	rushes	to	
satisfaction	and	from	satisfaction	leaps	to	new	desires.	
It	is	through	this	self-overcoming	that	we	will	become	
“poets	of	our	life	—	first	of	all	 in	the	smallest,	most	
everyday	matters”	(GS,	299).
In	a	great	poem,	every	word	and	syllable	is	inte-
gral	to	the	whole.	As	Saint	Exupery	put	it:	“You	know	
a	work	of	art	is	finished	not	when	there	is	nothing	left	
to	add,	but	nothing	left	to	take	away.”	Living	life	like	a	
work	of	art	would,	ideally,	involve	having	every	aspect	
of	your	existence	contribute	to	the	poetic	effect	of	the	
whole,	partake	 in	your	 guiding	 taste,	 your	 “unity	of	
artistic	style”	(UM,	5).	However	we	have	one	hulking	
hindrance	 that	 seemingly	 blocks	 this	 endeavor:	 the	
past.	Though	we	can	guide	our	becoming	in	the	present	
through	self-overcoming,	we	seem	to	be	powerless	to	
impose	our	guiding	taste	upon	those	parts	of	our	life	
that	predate	this	taste.	As	Zarathustra	initially	laments:	
“The	will	cannot	will	backwards	…	that	is	the	will’s	
loneliest	melancholy”	(Z,	II,	20).	However,	he	goes	on	
to	offer	an	avenue	—	a	certain	way	of	living	—	that	
would	 indeed	allow	 the	past	 to	be	brought	 into	 line	
with	our	current	style.
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One	can	use	the	psychological	test	of	“the	eternal	
recurrence”	to	ascertain	whether	one	is	living	in	such	
a	manner.	The	test	goes	as	such:	What	if	a	demon	were	
to	“steal	after	you	into	your	loneliest	of	loneliness	and	
say	to	you:	‘This	life	as	you	now	live	it	and	have	lived,	
you	will	have	to	live	once	more	and	innumerable	times	
more	…’”	(GS,	341).	Would	you	be	satisfied	enough	with	
how	you	have	lived	your	life	so	far	to	say:	“Yes!	Once	
more!”	Or	would	you	be	terrified	at	the	thought?	Would	
you	plead	with	the	demon	to	give	you	a	‘do-over?’	The	
eternal	recurrence	test	should	inspire	the	self-creator	to	
live	in	a	way	that	he	or	she	would	be	willing	to	live	it	
eternal	times	more.	This	view	makes	every	action	and	
event	 reverberate	 with	 eternal	 significance	 because	
we	have	only	this	life	to	shape	the	wet	cement	of	our	
existence	before	it	sets	for	eternity.
Essential	 to	 eternal	 recurrence	 is	 that	no aspect	
of	our	lives	is	unnecessary.	If	we	were	to	change	one	
aspect	or	event	of	it,	we	would	not	be	who	we	are,	we	
would	be	someone	else.	Nehamas	puts	it	best:	“a	life	
that	was	different	in	any	way	would	simply	not	be	our	
life:	it	would	be	the	life	of	a	different	person.	To	want	
to	be	a	different	in	any	way	is	for	Nietzsche	to	want	
to	be	different	in	every	way;	it	is	to	want,	impossible	
as	that	is,	to	be	somebody	else”	(Nehamas,	156).	The	
self-creator	wants	only	to	be	himself	or	herself.		She	or	
he	will	“learn	more	and	more	to	see	as	beautiful	what	
is	necessary	in	things”	and	acquire	Amor fati,	the	love	
of	fate,	which	will	in	turn	allow	him	or	her	to	“be	one	
of	 those	who	make	 things	beautiful”	(GS,	276):	 that	
is,	a	creator.
Why We Should Create Ourselves
This	idea	allows	us	to	segue	from	‘how’	one	might	cre-
ate	oneself	as	a	work	of	art	to	grounds	for	‘why’	one	
might	do	 so.	Though	Nietzsche	never	 systematically	
spelled	out	the	various	grounds	on	which	he	extolled	
self-creation	—	or	systematically	spelled	out	any	other	
topic,	for	that	matter	—	we	can	construct	an	interpre-
tation	from	his	body	of	work	to	divine	his	whys	and	
wherefores.	Returning	to	our	line	of	inquiry,	consider	
Zarathustra’s	statement:
Have	you	ever	 said	Yes	 to	a	 single	 joy?	
O	my	friends,	then	you	have	said	Yes	too	to	
all	woe.	All	 things	 are	 entangled,	 ensnared,	
enamored;	if	ever	you	wanted	one	thing	twice,	
if	ever	you	said,	‘You	please	me,	happiness!	
Abide,	moment!’	 then	you	wanted	all back.	
All	anew,	all	eternally,	all	entangled,	ensnared,	
enamored	(Z,	IV,	19).
Self-creation	 is	 a	method	 for	 affirming	not	 only	
some	aspects	of	our	life	but	all	aspects	of	our	life,	and	
indeed,	of	affirming	all	of	life.		“Creation…	is	the	great	
redemption	from	suffering”	for	we	can	affirm	our	woes	
because	“much	bitter	dying”	is	necessary	so	“that	the	
creator	may	be”	(Z,	199).	Thus,	self-creation	opens	the	
door	 to	Nietzsche’s	 conception	of	 redemption:	 “The	
deep	 instinct	 for	how	one	must	 live,	 in	order	 to	 feel	
oneself	‘in	heaven,’	to	feel	‘eternal,’	while	in	all	other	
behavior	one	decidedly	does	not	feel	‘in	heaven’	—	this	
alone	is	the	psychological	reality	of	‘redemption.’	A	new	
way	of	life,	not a	new	faith”	(A,	33).	
When	 we	 attain	 a	 new	 way	 of	 life	 through	 the	
self-overcoming	 of	 our	 self-creation,	we	 can	 feel	 ‘in	
heaven,’	which	means	the	feeling	that	we	have	overcome	
ourselves,	that	we	are	‘turning	out	well,’	that	we	have	
Nietzsche’s	conception	of	happiness:	“The	feeling	that	
power	is	growing,	that	resistance	is	overcome”	(A,	2).	
When	we	feel	that	we	are	‘becoming	who	we	are,’	we	
redeem	every	aspect	of	our	lives	because	all	were	nec-
essary	to	bring	us	to	this	present.	In	this	way	we	“will	
backwards”	and	shape	the	fragments	of	our	past	—	our	
“it	was”	—	into	“thus	I	willed	it”	(Z,	II,	20)	by	resetting	
them	into	this	newly	created	narrative	of	our	selfhood.
However	the	preponderances	of	‘I’s	and	‘self’s	in	
this	paper	leads	us	to	a	criticism	of	Nietzsche’s	concept	
of	self-creation	and	his	philosophy	in	general:	 isn’t	 it	
egoistic	and	narcissistic?	What	could	be	more	conceited	
than	walking	around	saying	“my	great	project	is	to	live	
my life	as	a	great	work	of	art?”		Could	society	function	if	
every	member	focused	selfishly	on	his	or	her	own	life?
First	of	all,	Nietzsche	doesn’t	believe	anybody	acts	
unselfishly.	We	see	this	stance	reflected	in	the	quote:	
“Magnanimity	contains	the	same	degree	of	egoism	as	
does	revenge,	but	egoism	of	a	different	quality”	(GS,	49).	
Everybody	ultimately	does	what	she	or	he	wants,	thus	
every	action	is	egoistic:	an	instrument	used	to	fulfill	a	
desire	or	drive.	This	is	seen	in	Nietzsche’s	critique	of	
the	ascetic	ideal	or	a	more	quotidian	example:	If	you	
are	on	a	diet	and	you	deny	yourself	food	that	you	want	
to	eat,	it	may	appear	that	you	are	not	doing	what	you	
want.	However	you	are	actually	just	choosing	to	satisfy	
the	desire	to	lose	weight	rather	than	the	desire	to	have	
sensual	pleasure.	Nietzsche	 interprets	altruistic	acts	
in	the	same	way.		Self-creators	do	not	deceive	them-
selves	and	compromise	their	intellectual	conscience	
by	costuming	egoism	in	the	garb	of	altruism.
Though	all	our	actions	are	inherently	egoistic,	as	the	
above	quote	shows,	egoistic	actions	differ	in	terms	of	
quality.	After	admitting	that	we	always	do	what	we	think	
will	achieve	our	wants,	self-creation	involves	wanting 
the right things.	These	‘right	things’	will	be	specific	to	
our	own	taste	and	‘straight	line	and	goal,’	but	insofar	
as	we	will	want	to	create	ourselves	as	someone	‘noble	
and	high’	and	not	‘petty	and	low’	—	admitting	these	
values	are	defined	according	to	individual	taste	—	we	
will	 eschew	 the	 petty	 egoism	of	 revenge	 that	 harms	
both	avenger	and	target	in	favor	of	the	noble	egoism	of	
magnanimity.	Honest	egoism	that	avoids	resentment	is	
good	for	both	the	egoist	and	the	world	at	large	because	
Nietzsche	believes	resentment	is	harmful	for	both	the	
resenter	and	the	target	of	resentment.
The	 hallmark	 of	 narcissism	 is	 excessive	 self-re-
flection;	 this	was	 literally	what	 entranced	Narcissus.	
Nietzsche	 attacked	 excessive	 self-reflection	 not	 only	
on	the	grounds	delineated	above,	i.e.,	that	it	can	freeze	
becoming	 into	 the	stasis	of	being,	but	on	 the	 related	
grounds	that	narcissism,	excessive	self-love,	halts	our	
self-overcoming.	If	you	‘love	yourself	just	the	way	you	
are’	you	won’t	seek	to	improve	on	what	you	are.	Thus	
Nietzsche	believes	the	self-creator	will	actually	be	con-
cerned	with	people	beside	herself	or	himself.	As	he	says:	
“Morally	speaking,	neighbor	love,	living	for	others,	and	
other	things	can	be	a	protective	measure	for	preserving	
the	hardest	self-concern.	This	is	the	exception	where,	
against	my	wont	and	conviction,	I	side	with	the	‘selfless’	
drives:	here	they	work	in	the	service	of	self-love	and	
self-discipline”	(EH,	II,	9).	Insofar	as	these	altruistic	mo-
tives	and	deeds	prevent	us	from	falling	into	the	infinite	
regress	of	full-blown	narcissism,	they	actually	turn	out	to	
be	our	own	best	interest,	as	well	as	others.	The	‘hardest	
self	concern’	involves	not always being	concerned	with	
yourself.	Because	self-creation	involves	the	avoidance	of	
excessive	self-reflection,	it	is	not	narcissistic.
The	self-creator	will	actually	manifest	the	‘altruistic’	
morals	of	the	herd:	“[Y]ou	will	always	encounter	[pov-
erty,	humility,	and	chastity]	to	a	certain	degree”	in	the	
lives	of	“great,	fruitful,	inventive	spirits”	(GM,	III,	8).	
However	the	self-creator	does	not	achieve	this	directly,	
but	as	the	unintentional	result	of	his	or	her	project	of	
self-creation.	Because	self-creation	involves	cultivating	
certain	desires,	virtues,	and	projects,	it	necessarily	entails	
forgoing	 all	 other	 ‘non-essential’	 desires,	 virtues	 and	
projects.	The	self-creator	 forgoes	 these	selfish	desires	
because	he	or	she	recognizes	life	as	a	zero-sum	game.	
She	or	he	simply	has	better	things	to	do	than	strive	for	
such	transient	self-gratification.
If	we	look	at	Nietzsche	himself	as	representing	the	
self-creator	or	overman,	we	see	that	the	overman,	is	not	
some	malevolent,	 egotistical	wrecking	ball	 smashing	
everything	in	its	wake	as	it	follows	its	own	trajectory.	
Nietzsche,	the	‘great	immoralist,’	was	a	decent	and	polite	
man.	Though	he	would	have	hated	the	terms,	he	was	
‘nice’	and	‘kind,’	someone	whose	last	sane	act	was	to	
embrace	a	horse	that	was	being	cruelly	beaten	on	the	
streets	of	Turin.	Though	he	‘selfishly’	gave	himself	a	per-
sonal	categorical	imperative,	this	morality	was	actually	
stricter	than	those	around	him.	Thus	such	an	egoistic	
project	does	not	mean	you	will	 automatically	exploit	
and	harm	those	around	you.
Indeed,	Nietzsche	suggests	this	selfish	project	will	
help	both	oneself	and	others	 in	 two	 important	ways.	
First	of	all,	the	process	of	self-creation,	of	‘giving	style	to	
one’s	character’	allows	one	to	“attain satisfaction	with	
[oneself]”	(GS,	290).	This	satisfaction	is	desirable	be-
cause,	for	Nietzsche,	petty	and	negative	behavior	stems	
from	dissatisfaction	with	oneself,	from	being	ashamed	
of	who	one	is.		Ashamed	persons	seek	ways	of	deny-
ing	responsibility	for	having	‘turned	out	bad’	and	thus	
they	seek	to	denigrate	the	world	around	them,	whether	
in	 general	 or	 particular	 people	 around	 them.	 When	
Nietzsche	says:	“Whom	do	you	call	bad?	—	Those	who	
always	want	to	put	to	shame”	(GS,	73),	he	means	these	
dissatisfied	people	who	devalue	those	around	them	in	
order	to	bring	others	‘down	to	their	level.’		Conversely,	
the	 self-satisfied,	 self-creative	 individual	 does	 not	
‘bring	others	down’	but	instead	not	only	spares	others	
shame	 (GS,	74),	but	potentially	 ‘raises	others	up’	by	
providing	 them	an	example	of	a	 liberated	 individual,	
for	Nietzsche	considers	“the	 seal	of	 liberation”	 to	be	
“no	longer…ashamed	in	front	of	oneself”	(GS,	75).	As	
the	maxim	has	it:	You	have	to	love	yourself	before	
you	can	love	someone	else.	Self-creation	is	a	means	
of	becoming	excellent	and	this	in	itself	contributes	
to	both	society	and	individual,	for	Nietzsche	holds	
that	“civilized	conditions”	require	“everyone	[to	be]	
superior	in	one	thing”	for	this	allows	the	individual	
to	both	“be	helpful	and…thus	feel	free	to	accept	help	
without	a	sense	of	shame”	(HH,	509).
Secondly,	 the	 self-creative	 individual’s	 path	 to	
self-creation	is	by	no	means	entirely	an	‘internal’	affair.	
The	 creator	will	 necessarily	 seek	ways	 of	 externally	
manifesting	his	or	her	virtues	and	talents,	whether	as	a	
painting,	a	building	project,	a	book	or,	as	in	Nietzsche’s	
case,	a	philosophy.	Because	this	creation	will	manifest	
the	creator’s	individual	and	idiosyncratic	talents,	will	be	
something	that	only she or he	could	have	produced,	he	
or	she	will	give	the	world	something	unique	and	never	
before	seen,	thus	pushing	forward	the	possibilities	of	
what	human	beings	are	capable	of	producing.
Why	will	the	creator	externally	manifest	his	or	her	
virtues?	If	we	are	what	we	do,	the	only	way	to	be	great	
is	to	do	something	great.	The	creator	will	be	such	a	fruit-
ful	and	generative	force,	she	or	he	will	‘flow	over’	with	
creativity	and	from	this	overflow	will	contribute	to	those	
around	him	or	her	out	of	what	Nietzsche	calls	the	“gift-
giving	virtue.”		This	gift-giving	both	benefits	the	giver	
and	the	receiver.	Thus	the	fruits	of	self-creation	blur	the	
lines	between	altruism	and	egoism.	The	world	is	a	better	
place	because,	say,	Beethoven	‘selfishly’	chose	to	chase	
the	limits	of	his	talents	as	far	they	would	take	him.
This	cultivated	fruitfulness	of	the	creator	ultimately	
creates	that	creator	and	his	or	her	creation.	This	brings	us	
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to	perhaps	the	most	important	reason	for	why	one	should	
create	one’s	self.	Nietzsche	denies	all	otherworlds.	With-
out	God,	Heaven,	and	the	soul,	it	seems	we	are	denied	
the	possibility	of	outliving	our	death,	denied	immortality.	
However	self-creation	and	its	fruit,	the	creation	of	some	
great	work,	offers	us	a	path	to	a	this-worldly	immortality.	
In	death,	when	the	creator	“himself	is	now	nothing	but	
the	grey	ashes”	“the	fire”	kindled	by	his	great	works	can	
continue	to	blaze,	thus	when	one	considers	that	“every	
action	performed	by	a	human	being	becomes	in	some	
way	 the	 cause	 of	 other	 actions,	 decisions,	 thoughts,	
that	everything	that	happens	is	inextricably	knotted	to	
everything	 that	will	happen,	one	 comes	 to	 recognize	
the	existence	of	an	actual	immortality,	that	of	motion”	
(HH,	208).	We	 live	on	 to	 the	extent	 that	our	actions	
continue	to	produce	effects	in	the	world	after	our	death.	
Those	self-creators	who	have	cultivated	greatness	and	
produced	great	works	can	achieve	this	secular	immortal-
ity.	By	discussing	and	freshly	interpreting	Nietzsche’s	
creations	here,	 I	have	in	a	small	manner	perpetuated	
and	contributed	to	his	“immortality	of	motion”	set	in	
motion	over	a	century	ago.
We	 can	question	 the	worth	 of	 self-creation	 from	
another	perspective:	Nietzsche’s	perspectivism.	 	This	
philosophical	position	poses	problems	for	proselytizing:	
because	he	denies	that	humans	have	access	to	universal	
truths,	he	concludes	that	our	conceptions	of	reality	are	
always	subjective	by	virtue	of	the	limited	perspective	
from	which	we	observe	 them.	 	 Science,	 freewill	 and	
other	 treasured	 concepts	 are,	 ultimately,	 “necessary	
fictions”	 that	 simplify,	 and	 thus	 falsify,	 reality	 into	 a	
manageable	shape.	Nietzsche	recognizes	“untruth	as	a	
condition	of	life”	(BGE,	4).	If	this	is	so,	does	that	not	
mean	that	Nietzsche’s	own	philosophy	is	just	another	
assemblage	of	untruth?	If	so,	why	would	we	pick	this	
interpretation	over	another?
Nietzsche,	to	avoid	being	a	self-deceptive	hypocrite,	
must	admit	that	his	philosophy	is	only	an	interpretation.	
However	this	is	not	damning:	according	to	this	interpre-
tation,	interpretations	are	all	we	can	have.	To	demand	
more	is	impossible.	To	believe	you	have	‘The	Truth’	is	
to	delude	yourself	out	of	a	weakness	of	character	that	
demands	a	degree	of	certainty	humanity	is	not	capable	
of	 attaining.	 The	 self-creating	master	merely	desires	
certainty,	while	the	slave	demands certainty	(GS,	288).	
Furthermore,	some	falsehoods	are	more	false	than	oth-
ers.	All	interpretations	are	not	created	equal.	To	inter-
pret	Nietzsche’s	work	as,	say,	a	Christian	apologetic	is	
certainly	a	worse	interpretation	than	the	one	this	paper	
presents.	 Such	 an	 interpretation	 would	 be	 willfully	
misreading	reality	or	reading	into	it	things	that	are	not	
there	—	which	is	what	Nietzsche	believes	Christianity	
does	when	it	‘reads	into’	the	‘text’	of	reality	the	unreal	
realms	of	heaven	and	hell.	Thus	Nietzsche	believes	his	
untruths	are	less	false	than	Christian	untruths	because	
he	has	undertaken	the	creation	of	his	worldview	with	
an	‘intellectual	conscience’	that	seeks	the	truth	as	much	
as	 possible,	 though	 ultimate	 attainment	 will	 always	
elude	it.
Our	worldview	 is	 intimately	 connected	with	 our	
morality	 and	 ourselves.	All	 three	 interpenetrate	 and	
influence	 the	becoming	of	 the	others:	 thus	 the	 false-
hoods	we	live	by	influence	who	we	become,	who	we	
are.		Nietzsche’s	ultimate	grounds	for	favoring	his	phi-
losophy	over	others	is	that	he	believes	it	will	produce	
a	better	you,	a	better	humanity,	usually	expressed	with	
the	metaphor	of	‘health.’		His	philosophy	will	make	you	
‘healthy’	enough	to	achieve	great	things.	But	this	just	
continues	the	shell	game	of	justification.	What	makes	
something	healthy?	For	Nietzsche,	something	is	healthy	
to	the	extent	that	it	is	‘life-promoting.’		Because	“[l]ife	
itself	is	to	my	mind	the	instinct	for	growth,	for	durabil-
ity,	 for	an	accumulation	of	 forces,	 for	power”	 (A,	6),	
life-promoting	or	healthy	acts	are	those	that	make	us	
grow	in	power	and	durability.	But	this	definition	of	life,	
which	is	the	basis	of	these	valuations,	is	itself	another	
interpretation,	 another	 untruth.	Without	 recourse	 to	
a	universal	ground	of	morality,	Nietzsche	cannot	ulti-
mately	justify	why	his	values	are	better	than	others.	To	
justify	something	means	to	judge	it	necessary	or	right	
according	to	criteria	outside	of	the	situation	justified.	
Nietzsche’s	 denial	 of	 a	 humanly	 knowable	 absolute	
truth	lying	outside	of	human	understanding	precludes	
the	possibility	of	these	outside	criteria.
The	impossibility	of	external	justification	for	our	
project	of	self-creation	brings	us	back	to	our	theme	
of	‘living	life	like	a	work	of	art.’	Now	we	can	see	that	
this	trope	appealed	to	Nietzsche	precisely	because	art	
creates	its	own	justification.	Great	works	of	art	justify	
themselves	not	by	recourse	to	some	outside	source,	
say	a	literary	theory,	but	from	within,	from	the	very	
appeal	of	their	appearance.	This	is	the	meaning	behind	
Nietzsche’s	 statement:	 “Only	 as	 an	aesthetic	product	
can	the	world	be	justified	to	all	eternity”	(BT,	5).	When	
Nietzsche	later	‘revises’	this	statement	to	only	“as	an	
aesthetic	phenomenon”	is	existence	“still	bearable	for	
us”	(GS,	107)	he	is	simply	taking	his	original	thought	
to	its	logical	conclusion:	if	we	live	our	life	artfully,	we	
ourselves	are	our	own	justification	for	ourselves;	as	such,	
this	project	of	living	ever	more	artfully	gives	a	meaning	
to	our	life,	a	why	to	life.	This	project	makes	life	bearable	
by	giving	meaning	to	our	suffering,	for	man	will	endure	
any	how	so	long	as	he	has	a	why.
Ultimately	life	is	“full	of	sound	and	fury/signify-
ing	nothing”	 (Shakespeare,	Macbeth,	Act	V,	 Scene	
V).		But	why	should	we	use	the	words	“ultimately	
meaningless”	with	a	slanderous	intent?	The	notion	
of	“ultimate	meaning”	is	nonsensical.	We	should	not	
condemn	the	world	for	not	being	as	we	would	like	it	
to	be.	We	should	take	the	world	as	it	is.	Like	it	or	not,	
this	world	and	this	life	are	the	only	ones	we	have.	
The	philosophy	and	the	philosopher	that	Nietzsche	
created	orbit	around	one	goal:	not	just	to	‘like’	the	
way	things	are,	but	to	love	them,	to	affirm	life	in	such	
a	world.	This	is	the	mindset	of	the	noble	free	spirit,	the	
self-overcoming	self-creator:	earnestly	self-overcoming	
to	create	a	greater	and	greater	self,	all	the	while	recog-
nizing	this	self	and	its	worldview,	its	tablets	of	virtue	
are	all	‘holy	lies’	and	thus	not	taking	it	all	so	seriously,	
reveling	in	the	lightness	of	being:	 in	this	way	we	are	
paradoxically	serious	enough	to	work	toward	our	goal	
while	being	able	to	laugh	at	ourselves,	able	to	“laugh	
and	be	elevated	at	the	same	time”	(Z,	153).	
It	is	a	testament	to	the	unity	of	Nietzsche’s	thought	
that	we	find	this	same	idea	in	his	first	work:	“The	Diony-
sian	man…realize[s]	that	no	action	of	[his]	can	work	any	
change	in	the	eternal	condition	of	things…	[and	thus]	
in	order	to	act	[he]	require[s]	the	veil	of	illusion”	(BT,	
7).	These	illusions,	which	we	recognize	as	illusions,	still	
allow	us	to	love	our	fate	and	our	world	enough	to	create:	
“For	it	is	only	in	love,	only	when	shaded	by	the	illusion	
produced	by	love…that	man	creates”	(UM,	95).	
With	this	love	of	this	world	and	our	fate	within	it,	
hopefully	we	will	have	the	bravery	and	passion	to	live	
dangerously	 under	 the	 aspect	 of	 eternity	 in	 order	 to	
become	who	we	are,	a	corona	of	energy	managing	to	
manifest	its	flux	into	its	most	luminous	of	possible	forms	
before	ultimately	returning	to	the	surging,	eternal	mael-
strom	of	energy	that	is	life.	We	become	the	child	who	
understands	the	meaning	of	Nietzsche’s	most	beautiful	
and	powerful	aphorism:
Seriousness	 in	 play	—	 In	Genoa	 at	 the	
time	of	evening	twilight	I	heard	coming	from	
a	tower	a	long	peal	of	bells:	it	seemed	it	would	
never	stop,	resounding	as	though	it	could	never	
have	enough	of	itself,	of	the	noise	of	the	streets	
out	into	the	evening	sky	and	the	sea	breeze,	so	
chilling	and	at	the	same	time	so	childlike,	so	
melancholy.	Then	I	recalled	the	words	of	Plato	
and	suddenly	they	spoke	to	my	heart:	Nothing 
human is worthy of being taken very seriously; 
nonetheless…(HH,	628).
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